



Multi-Tenant Access Control for Collaborative Cloud Services

CS6393 Spring 2014 PhD Seminar

Bo Tang

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
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Shared infrastructure \$ [\$\$\$] ----> [\$|\$|\$]

- ➢ Multi-Tenancy
 - Virtually dedicated resources
 - o E.g.: rent-a-car
- ➢ Problems:
 - Who owns the data?
 - How to collaborate across tenants?
 - o Even if across my own tenants?





Source: http://blog.box.com/2011/06/box-and-google-docs-accelerating-the-cloud-workforce/





Distributed Authority

- Each tenant manages its own authorization
- Centralized Facility
 - Resource pooling
- ➢ Agility

Tenants, users and resources are temporary

➢ Homogeneity

Identical or similar architecture and system settings

Out-Sourcing Trust

Built-in collaboration spirit





> All deployment models are multi-tenant


- E.g.: public cloud, private cloud and community cloud.
- From Cloud Service Provider (CSP) perspective
 - A billing customer
 - Manages its own users and cloud resources
- From consumer perspective
 - An individual, an organization or a department in an organization, etc.

*virtually dedicated space with on-demand self-service



DevOps in the Cloud









➢ RBAC

- CBAC, GB-RBAC, ROBAC
- No cross-organization interaction
- Require central authority managing collaborations
- Delegation Models
 - dRBAC and PBDM (e.g.: allowing subleasing)
 - Lacks agility (which the cloud requires)

➤Grids

- CAS, VOMS, PERMIS
- Heavy authorization overhead due to the absence of homogeneous infrastructure (which the cloud has)





➢ Role-based Trust

- RT, Traust, RMTN AND RAMARS_TM
- Calero et al: towards a multi-tenancy authorization system for cloud services
 - o Implementation level PoC
 - Open for extensions in trust models
- Suits the cloud (out-sourcing trust)

Challenge:

- Trust relation
- Finer-grained models
- Administration





Standardized APIs

Cross-tenant accesses are functionally available


Proper authentication of users

- ➢ Removable assumptions:
 - One Cloud Service
 - Of a kind: IaaS, PaaS or SaaS etc.
 - Two-Tenant Trust (rather than community trust)
 - Unidirectional Trust Relations (like follow in Twitter)
 - Unilateral Trust Relations (trustor or trustee)



Multi-Tenant Access Control









Tenant Trust (TT) relation is not partial order
 It is

- $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{A} \\$
- ♦ But not transitive: $A \trianglelefteq B \land B \trianglelefteq C \Rightarrow A \trianglelefteq C$
- ♦ Neither symmetric: $A ext{ } ext{ } B ext{ } \Rightarrow B ext{ } A$
- ♦ Nor anti-symmetric: $A \trianglelefteq B \land B \trianglelefteq A \Rightarrow A \equiv B$






Four potential trust types:

- *****Type-α: trustor can <u>give</u> access to trustee.
- *****Type-β: trustee can <u>give</u> access to trustor.
- *****Type-γ: trustee can <u>take</u> access from trustor.
- *****Type-δ: trustor can <u>take</u> access from trustee.
 - No meaningful use case, since the trustor holds all the control of the cross-tenant assignments of the trustee's permissions.






Example: Temporary DevOps access [\$]: grant Dennis@DEV access to HR.PRD \star Trust- α : • PRD trusts DEV so that PRD can say [\$]. **Trust-\beta:** • DEV trusts PRD so that PRD can say [\$]. Trust-y: • PRD trusts DEV so that DEV can say [\$].





Formalized CTTM Model








Role-Based CTTM






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


Role-Based CTTM





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


Example: Temporary DevOps access
 \$[\$]: grant Dennis@DEV access to HR.PRD
 Trust-α (RT):

 PRD trusts DEV so that PRD can say [\$].
 Trust-β (MTAS):

 DEV trusts PRD so that PRD can say [\$].
 Trust-γ (MT-RBAC):
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
• PRD trusts DEV so that DEV can say [\$].











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Issuers are administered by the CSP

- Each issuer administer:
 - trust relations with other issuers
 - entity components: users, roles and permissions
 - UA, PA and RH assignments
 - Cross-tenant assignments are issued by the trustee
 - UA: trustor users to trustee roles
 - PA: trustee permissions to trustor roles
 - RH: trustee roles junior to trustor roles





Problem of MTAS trust model

Over exposure of trustor's authorization information

Trustor-Centric Public Role (TCPR)


Expose only the trustor's public roles

➢ Relation-Centric Public Role (RCPR)

Expose public roles specific for each trust relation



Example MTAS policy structure



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
Experiment Settings

CloudStorage: an open source web based cloud storage and sharing system.

Joyent, FlexCloud

- Authorization Service
 - Centralized PDP


Distributed PEP







- > MTAS introduces ≈ 12 ms overhead in average.
- Scalable
 - Capability proportional to throughput








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
• PRD trusts DEV so that DEV can say [\$].





MT-RBAC









- Issuers administer tenants
- Each issuer administer:
 - Trust relations from owned tenants
 - Entity components: tenants, users, roles and permissions
 - UA, PA and RH assignments
 - Cross-tenant assignments are issued by the trustee's owning issuer
 - UA: trustee users to trustor roles
 - PA: trustor permissions to trustee roles
 - RH: trustor roles junior to trustee roles





Trustee-Independent Public Role (TIPR)

- Expose only the trustor's public roles
- Trustee-Dependent Public Role (TDPR)
 - Expose public roles specific for each trustee


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Cyclic Role Hierarchy: lead to implicit role upgrades in the role hierarchy
Tenant 1

- SoD: conflict of duties
 - Tenant-level
 - E.g.: SOX compliance companies may not hire the same company for both consulting and auditing.
 - Role-level
 - o across tenants

Chinese Wall: conflict of interests among tenants

o E.g.: do not share infrastructure with competitors.










Policy Specification of MT-RBAC










MT-RBAC vs RBAC

More policy references incur more decision time

> MT-RBAC₂ introduces 16 ms overhead in average.



PDP Performance

Client-End Performance






➢ Scalable by either

Enhancing PDP capability; or


Increasing PEP amount.







Example: Temporary DevOps access [\$]: grant Dennis@DEV access to HR.PRD $Trust-\alpha$ (RT): • PRD trusts DEV so that PRD can say [\$]. **\bigstar** Trust-β (MTAS): \circ DEV trusts PRD so that PRD can say [\$]. Trust-γ (MT-RBAC): • PRD trusts DEV so that DEV can say [\$].









> MT-RT: "P" layer model of RT with MT features


- No certificate is required (centralized facility)
- Trust (delegation) in OpenStack identity?





DevOps in OpenStack

















rule:add_user_to_tenant -> (role:keystone_admin ||
 (role:tenant_admin && tenant_id:%(target_tenant_id)s) ||
 (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s))

rule:add_tenant_to_domain -> (role:keystone_admin || (domain_role:domain_admin && domain_id:%(target_domain_id)s))

Source: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Domains






Enhanced security

- Limit visibility in the specific domain
- Prevent malicious / dumb assignments
- Better management with Dtrust
 - Specified by domain admin available for project admin
 - Automatic revocation of cross-domain assignments
 - Finer-grained control enabled
 - \odot Only expose users with certain roles
 - May specify collaborating users and projects



MT-ABAC









Completed Work **CTTM** MTAaaS **MT-RBAC** ➢ On-going research **MT-RT MT-ABAC**

Domain Trust in OpenStack



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
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